This is a modified version of a paper on the philosophy and economics of liberalism. The paper was first written in the 1980s in a competition for a prize awarded by the Mont Pelerin Society. It was revised recently to submit to a libertarian journal but was rejected by the referee on the grounds that that it assumed that Popper’s ideas on knowledge and rationality are correct. The implication is that Popper’s ideas need to be defended rather than taken as read. The referee pointed out that most philosophy of science subsequent to Popper is anti-Popperian. And in my paper it seemed that “mere disagreement with the Popperian view is treated as evidence of ignorance of the Popperian view, as though Popper’s view is so blindingly self-evident that nobody could read it without being converted…One would never guess that anyone might reject Popper’s views because they were convinced by the arguments against these views”.
[This is the comment that triggered my survey of philosophy books and the literature at large to find out what people are being told about Popper. They are not being told anything about Bartley]
The idea of the paper was to point out some implications and applications of the Popper/Bartley line of thought on non-justificationism.
This is the original paper. In this post I will leave out all the preliminary stuff about classical liberalism as a non-authoritarian creed, the failure in the market of ideas due to cartels, monopolies and various forms of protectionism in the mind industry, and Bartley’s theory of metacontexts.
The background can be obtained from this review of Bartley’s The Retreat to Commitment, his paper on Rationality versus the theory of rationality and Popper’s essay “On the sources of knowledge and of ignorance”.
Liberalism and its Metacontexts
A metacontext may be compared with an ecological niche such as a nutrient broth or a seed-bed where some types of organism or plants thrive while others are stunted or killed outright. The metacontext of pancritical rationalism is hospitable to liberalism, while in contrast the justificationist metacontext is potentially lethal for the tradition of free thought. Liberalism has been forced to constantly work “against the grain” of the justificationist metacontext and so has survived precariously, with the gains of one generation often lost to the forces of irrationalism and authoritarianism in the next. But even worse than working against the grain, the traditional theory of rationality (based like its opponents on the assumption of justificationism) actually supports the justificationist metacontext. So rationalists, like Bertrand Russell, of the justificationist variety, unwittingly nurture the seedbed of their destruction.
This explains why the survival of liberalism is so precarious, why it needs auxiliaries to support its causes and why civilisation lapses into occasional bouts of irrationalism. Episodes such as the Nazi holocaust and the “generation of 1968” are generally regarded as strange aberrations in the normally rational Western tradition, perhaps calling for psychological analysis of the individuals involved, for studies of “the authoritarian personality” or ruminations on the “contradictions of developed capitalism” or the decline of religious faith. But seen from the perspective of Bartley’s work such failures of reason are only to be expected, especially during times of upheaval and uncertainty (as at present). And as long as this dogmatic or justificationist “metacontext” remains dominant our traditions of rationality, tolerance and freedom will remain fragile and liable to collapse at any time of social or political crisis.
Many important insights flow from Bartley’s account of the alternative metacontexts. It can be argued that justificationism accounts for virtually all forms of fanaticism and psychological rigidity. It accounts for the refusal of most philosophers to accept Popper’s solution to the problem of induction and his theory of conjectural knowledge. It explains the trials and tribulations of creative people, innovators and pioneers of all kinds who have often been driven literally mad by the difficulty of penetrating closed minds with new ideas. Bartley has precipitated “metacontext shift” in Western thought which calls for a complete rewriting of the history of ideas and a reconstruction of logic, morals and epistemology. In the light of this reconstruction some lines of thought will be turn out to be bankrupt (linguistic philosophy, much of sociology and economics) and others will come into their own, among them the Popperian school of philosophy and the Austrian school of economics.
Moving on to the applications: these are (1) resolving some tensions in the rationalism of Popper and Hayek, (2) the alleged problems of modern liberalism, (3) the closely related issue of the tension between the “Humean” and “Kantian” elements that Kukathas identified in his study of Hume, (4) Lester’s use of Popper and Bartley in Escape to Leviathan and (5) a rejoinder to the deconstructionists in the theory of literature.
Popper and Hayek retrieved
Three problems regarding apparent tensions in Popper’s and Hayek’s liberalism are here addressed and resolved in the metacontext of pancritical rationalism. These are the conflict between Hayek’s “moral iconoclasm” and “moral conservatism”, a similar problem with Popper’s theory of tradition and an apparent difference of emphasis between Popper and Hayek on rationality and the scope for critical appraisal of traditions.
The heart of liberalism is the critical attitude towards tradition but this stance is rendered problematic by the demand for positive justification which critics can use to force the dilemma of infinite regress versus dogmatism. This results in a problem for Hayek, as described by one of his greatest admirers.
John N Grey in “F A Hayek and the rebirth of classical liberalism”, (Literature of Liberty, Winter 1982) noted:
One of the commonest critiques of Hayek’s work (is) that it straddles incompatible conservative and liberal standpoints… and Hayek continues to advocate a strong form of moral conventionalism, resisting the claims of those who see modern morality as in the need of radical reform. There is thus tension, perhaps irresolvable in terms of Hayek’s system, between his Mandevillian moral iconoclasm and his moral conservatism.
Similar comments have been made on Popper’s theory of tradition and criticism, with the argument running as follows: Popper accepts that we need traditions to provide a framework of expectations and regularities in social life, otherwise we would be “anxious and confused”. But Popper also urges a rational (critical) attitude towards traditions and beliefs of all kinds. This raises the same questions as that posed above on Hayek’s iconoclasm and conservatism.
There is also a hint of contradiction between Popper’s anticonservative argument in “Towards a rational theory of tradition” (Conjectures and Refutations) and Hayek’s “The errors of constructivism” (New Studies). Popper’s essay was a reply to Oakeshott’s thoroughly conservative critique of the critical and reformist attitude towards traditional forms and practices. In reading Hayek’s critique of constructivist rationalism it appears at first that he is adopting Oakeshott’s position because he insists that we cannot subject our traditional heritage to criticism and “rational” reform at a stroke. But as his argument unfolds it turns out that he and Popper are converging on the same position from different directions because their polemic targets are the diametrically opposed theories of complete conservatism and radical iconoclasm.
They both adhere to a position of “critical rationalism” which takes account of the limitations of human knowledge and accepts that we need institutions and traditions without conceding that any of these are exempt from criticism in the light of all other values. They clearly adopt the stance of “critical preference” rather than “justified belief” and the suggestion of tension between iconoclasm and conservatism in their work arises from the implicit assumption that a moral belief can only be held and acted on if it is positively justified, beyond doubt. This assumption is part and parcel of the justificationist metacontext and people who hold this assumption cannot comprehend the notion of a tentative belief or a critical preference, made on the basis of evidence and arguments in hand but to open to change in the future.
In the metacontext created by Bartley no problem arise in dealing with Popper’s and Hayek’s views on tradition and the critical function of reason. This should have a valuable effect in freeing these two great Old Whigs from the reservations that many people feel about the perceived ambiguity of their stance. Many writers in the anti-socialist camp have made limited use of Popper and Hayek, and then often for purely negative purposes (battering Marxists), not for the more positive purpose of promoting liberal alternatives to the interventionist drift of public policy. In mixed liberal/conservative journals such as Quadrant and Encounter very few references to Popper and Hayek are found, and they are quite likely to be critical and uncomprehending. Similarly Popper and Hayek are scarcely mentioned in books on the Liberal Party of Australia which of course reflects the extent to which it is a conservative party, liberal only in name.
Popper and Hayek on the modern problems of liberalism
Liberalism is supposed to be under siege these days from a battery of critics who find fault with the alleged basis of liberalism in the “Cartesian subject” or the “individualistic social atom”. Max Charlesworth wrote in the Age Monthly Review (October, 1985)
The 18th and 19th Centuries’ view of the autonomous, asocial individual, which Mill and Russell absorbed with their mother’s milk and did not question, has been subjected to radical criticism from a number of very different quarters.
He instanced the Marxist critique of “possessive individualism” the Freudian emphasis on unconscious motivation, Foucalt’s death of the autonomous individual and Lacan’s theory of the subject as a mere vehicle of language. This line of thought is exemplified by Michael Sandel in his contribution to the volume Liberalism and its Critics (ed. Sandel, Blackwell, 1984). Sandel advocates a collectivist moral theory, against the individuality of liberalism, backed with the claim that the liberal theory of the individual is incoherent.
Freed from the dictates of nature and the sanctions of social roles, the deontological subject is installed as sovereign, cast as the author of the only moral meanings that there are…we are self-originating sources of valid claims.
Against this “liberal” view Sandel replied:
But we cannot regard ourselves as independent in this way without great cost to those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are.
This argument does not refute the liberalism of Popper and Hayek, indeed Sandel reproduced part of the case that Hayek brought against the constructivist rationalists. Sandel’s case is confused by a lack of specificity in his critique (work of liberals is scarcely cited) and his own positive case is not convincingly developed. But the collectivist thrust is clear enough, as it is with other participants in the revival of Hegelian ideas. Bhiku Parekh wrote in Contemporary Political Philosophers (Martin Robertson, 1982).
…the categories in terms of which most political philosophers conceptualise the state are rooted in nineteenth century liberalism and are almost wholly inadequate. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right has more to say about the nature of the modern state than does the work of our contemporaries.
Popper and Hayek are not trapped by the critiques of “social atom” theories of individualism, nor by critiques of theories which depend on a mythical “social contract” in which such atoms established a social order for mutual support and protection. If social contract theory is indeed at the heart of classical liberalism then Popper and Hayek provide a vital corrective. They accepted that humans were social or communal animals long before the discovery or invention of language and the formulation of ideas about freedom and individualism. The real thrust of the collectivist critique of individualism is to destroy the belief that individualism provides justification for liberal principles. But in the metacontext of pancritical rationalism it is apparent that positive justification cannot be provided for any set of beliefs and the liberalism of Popper, Hayek and Bartley does not depend on the attainment of that impossible goal.
Chandran Kukathas on the tensions in Hayek.
The following argument is taken from this review.
Kukathas, in Hayek and Modern Liberalism pursued some of Gray’s intimations on the dissonance in Hayek’s system between his “Mandevillian moral iconoclasm” and his moral conservatism, between his traditionalist and libertarian tendencies and between his rational and sceptical allegiances. The bottom line of my argument is that these problems can be resolved by rejecting the foundationist turn in Hayek’s thought.
Kukathas argue that Hayek’s defence of liberalism would not hold because it rests on presuppositions that are incompatible. On the one hand, the scepticism and moral relativity of Hume, on the other, Kant’s quest for rationally justified foundations of belief. The tension between these contrary tendencies emerged time after time as Kukathas explored Hayek’s views on the key issues in political philosophy.
In his capacity as a conservative and sceptic Hayek asserted that ethics is not a matter of choice because “our morals are not (and cannot be) the product of design but are the result of a natural selection of traditions.” However the traditionalist Hayek was driven to seek reasons for adhering to traditional morality and he had a rationalist’s concern to defend principles such as the market order and the rule of law that are required for his vision of human progress. But to pursue these principles he was obliged to adopt an agenda of radical reform to “free the process of spontaneous growth from the obstacles and encumbrances that human folly has erected.” But if these obstacles belong to our traditional heritage, then where do we stand to put the lever of reform under them? Tensions of this kind prompted Kukathas’ conclusion that the foundations of Hayek’s liberalism will not hold. This conclusion begs the question that Kukathas raised in his final chapter on modern liberalism. “First, is it a defensible ideal and, secondly, how might it be defended?”
These questions took on fresh urgency when John Gray announced in the Postscript to the revised edition of his book on Liberalism that he had defected from liberalism due to its lack of rational foundations. This is a rather odd stance because Minogue’s contribution to Traditions of Liberalism (CIS 1988) shows that whatever classical liberalism may be it is not a foundationist enterprise. A similar view is implicit in a major, though unargued, conclusion by Kukathas that “Liberal theorists should turn away from their preoccupation with uncovering Kantian foundations for liberalism, and look again to Hume.”
In Hume we find a critical temper of mind, a blend of scepticism with respect for the truth and for valuable traditions. At the same time he recognised the need for continual improvement in our knowledge, our institutions and our practices. The challenge is to sustain Hume’s critical mood without lapsing into the corrosive form of moral relativism, which denies that there is any rational way to choose between rival theories or moral principles. The usual rejoinder to this latter view is to insist (like Kant) that there is indeed some authoritative source of justified beliefs. Unfortunately, opinions differ on the appropriate authority and all such theories run into the dilemma of “the infinite regress versus dogmatism”.
As described above, the damaging assumption here is that beliefs are only rational or valid if indeed they are positively (certainly) justified. And, as described, the answer is to abandon the quest for positive justification and settle for a critical preference for one option rather than others, in the light of arguments and evidence offered to that point. This appears to be a simple, commonsense position but it defies the dominant traditions of Western thought which are mostly concerned with theories of justification. If the stance of “critical preference” is adopted then the tension between the Humean and Kantian tendencies in Hayek’s thought may be resolved.
With Hayek’s foundational problems in order then some of the difficulties that Kukathas located in the body of his work may dissolve in turn. For example, the cluster of liberal policies (free trade, limited government, the rule of law etc) may be held on the grounds of critical preference over their rivals, given the larger objectives of peace, freedom and prosperity. Such a preference does not rest on faith or foundations, merely on the evidence of centuries of conscious or unconscious experimentation.
Jan Lester on liberty, welfare and anarchy.
Jan Lester’s book Beyond Leviathan (Macmillan 2000) possibly represents a landmark in the literature of liberalism on two counts. One is these is the robust statement of his major thesis on the compatibility of free markets, liberty and welfare. The other is the way he uses the non-authoritarian theory of rationality expounded by Popper and Bartley. A review essay on the book can be found on line.
His statement of the “compatibility thesis” runs as follows:
In practice (rather than in imaginary cases) and in the long term, there are no systematic clashes among interpersonal liberty, general welfare, and market anarchy, where these terms are to be understood roughly as follows: ‘interpersonal liberty’ is ‘not being imposed on by others’; ‘general welfare’ is ‘people having their unimposed wants satisfied’; ‘market anarchy’ is ‘unrestricted libertarian trade’; and the underpinning conception of ‘rationality’ is ‘agents always attempt to achieve what they most want under the perceived circumstances’.
Those who seek linguistic precision may be alarmed that his terms are to be understood roughly. Lester has quite deliberately avoided the kind of extended and unhelpful conceptual analysis (endless definition of terms), that Popper called “essentialism”. An anonymous reviewer for Amazon Books noted the remarkable amount of meat that is packed into the book. This is partly due to the self-conscious avoidance of essentialism, partly to Lester’s firm grasp on his materials and party to the mode of argumentation that he has adopted, following the non-justificationist or non-foundational line that has been articulated by Popper and Bartley.
The main characteristic of this approach is that it only attempts to achieve what is possible, namely the formation of a critical preference for one option rather than another, in the light of the evidence and arguments that are available up to date. Lester did not attempt the impossible, that is, to provide a logically conclusive proof of his case. What is possible is to propose a theory or a doctrine and subject it to criticism, then if it stands up we may proceed with that theory or doctrine until such time as an alternative is proposed that has better credentials and stands up to criticism at least as well as the previous candidate.
Lester pointed out that this resulted in a book that is full of other people’s criticisms of liberty, anarchy and free trade, with his rejoinders. One reader described this as a “set them up and knock them down” method, to which Lester he replied that he did not regard this as a valid criticism because it is precisely what critical rationalists, and indeed everyone else, should be doing. This may be contrasted with those who use the justificationist method to “build it up (yet again) and ignore the counter-arguments”.
A rejoinder to Howard Felperin on deconstructionism in literary studies.
The following argument first appeared in a volume of Critical Review devoted to postmodernism. A short form of the review.
Howard Felperin wrote Beyond Deconstructionism to explain and in part to defend the contribution of the deconstructionists in the contemporary dialogue on literary studies. It appears that the deconstructionists have adroitly located the weak point of Western philosophy, that is, the problem of establishing firm foundations for rational or supposedly justified beliefs, and the closely related problem of working out where to stop when a critic persists in asking for a statement to justify the previous statement that was offered in support of a position. This formulation of the problem of rational belief can be traced back to the ancient skeptics, among whom the work of Sextus Empiricus provides the first motto in Howard Felperin’s Beyond Deconstruction. What the deconstructionists have not yet done, however, is to pursue the kind of response to this problem that has been suggested by W. W. Bartley’s work on the limits of criticism and the ecology of rationality.
Following Bartley it can be argued that the deconstructionists proceed from a correct premise (there are no authorities to justify the foundations of belief) to a false conclusion (there is no way to form a tentative critical preference for one theory rather than another).
Felperin was prepared to look on the bright side and hope that good will come from the loss of foundations of belief. Commenting on the disappearance of privileged vantage points for authoritative statements, he suggested that this may be a very sad situation if literature and criticism are viewed ‘by analogy with science, as a body of knowledge.’ But he suggested that literature does not have to be approached like this, perhaps we might become liberated from the obsession with positive knowledge, and so ‘if literary activity is conceived not as issuing in a body of knowledge but in a mode of being, the absence of certainty or consensus in the study of texts is no longer a disability’ . Of course his reference to science as a body of knowledge betrays complete ignorance of post-Popperian philosophy of science, but this was only to be expected following his uncritical references to other philosophical sources such as Wittgenstein and Kuhn.
So the challenge of deconstruction as interpreted by Felperin is to find some way to move forward without foundations of belief, to achieve progress in knowledge and understanding of literature without expecting to produce a body of positive knowledge that is immune to change and revision. But what is the ‘mode of being’ that makes this possible? This is where the work of Popper and Bartley applies – they replied to the deconstructionist challenge at a deeper philosophical level than is usually offered by literary scholars and critics, certainly a deeper level than Felperin ventured. Bartley followed Popper in exploring the implications of the breakdown of traditional theories of knowledge and rationality which depend on various authorities for belief. This gives Popper and Bartley some common ground with the deconstructionists and their work contributes to the current literary debate in two ways. First, it clarifies the logical core of the position that the deconstructionists have occupied to conduct their reign of terror against opponents. I am not aware of any really clear articulation of this position in relation to deconstructionism, it just appears to operate as a powerful and pervasive but unstated subtext of debate. Second, it suggests a way to move forward to create a kind of philosophical space (a metacontext) where the absence of certainty or consensus in the study of texts is no longer a source of anxiety nor an excuse for obscurantism, seemingly for its own sake or for the sake of intimidating opponents by “obscurantist terrorism” (Foucault’s term to describe the tactic of writing in an incomprehensible manner and then accusing critics of failing to understand your position).
This analysis suggests that deconstruction is not so much a radical novelty as a revival of ancient skepticism in a new form. It draws its plausibility from the breakdown of virtually all theories of rationality and criticism in the face of the ‘dogmatism versus infinite regress’ dilemma. This in turn arises from the authoritarian tradition (the justificationist metacontext) of Western thought. However, it seems that Popper and Bartley have shown that this authoritarian tradition is not required to sustain viable theories of knowledge and rationality.
Conclusion
Liberals of the classical variety can gain a great deal from replacing theological or “true belief” theories of knowledge with the “critical preference” approach. The “true belief” tends to generate true believers who think that when they have hold of the truth (by reference to the proper authority) they are allowed to be intolerant of differences of opinion, whether on matters of religion, morals or politics. A difference of opinion may even be attributed to moral deficiencies on the part of the unbeliever, or to a conspiracy on the part of some malevolent power that seeks to keep people from knowing the truth. That kind of thinking underpins fanaticism and intolerance in many and varied forms, including political totalitarianism, cults of all kinds and institutions such as the Inquisition that attempt to save people from their own error and sin.
Given the historical preponderance of authoritarian theories of knowledge the traditions of democracy and tolerance wherever they exist at present must be seen as truly remarkable developments. They are also highly fragile which accounts for their tendency to break down during times of emergency such as war. Similarly, under stress, reasonable and tolerant people can break down and lapse into dogmatic and uncritical thinking. This observation is not a concession to pessimists who believe in the unregenerate irrationality of people. Quite the reverse; in view of the almost universal acceptance of authoritarian theories of knowledge it is difficult to see why people are ever tolerant and how a tradition of tolerance ever took root. This situation can be expected to improve with wider understanding of Popper’s non-authoritarian theory of knowledge and Bartley’s contribution to the ancient problem of rationality and the limits of criticism.
