See the Problem?

I wrote this as a quick comment on d’s blog, but then the post disappeared for some reason. Anyway, I thought I’d share here.

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Does Science Presuppose the Existence of Regularity in Nature?

A popular criticism of Popper’s scientific method is that he “smuggled induction in through the back door.” Contrary to claims of having done away with it altogether, Popper’s proposed method of science actually presupposes induction. Therefore, critics argue, Popper failed to give an account of the scientific method which avoids the problems of induction.

One such argument has it that Popper’s method of science must presuppose that nature has regularities. If nature has no regularities, then any conjecture positing such must be false. In that case, every conjecture that has so far withstood attempted falsification is just a fluke and may begin yielding false predictions any time. If there are no regularities in nature for scientists discover, then the method of conjecture and falsification is a futile endeavour. Therefore, if Popper’s proposed method of science is to have any success, then one must presuppose there are some regularities in nature.

My responses to this argument are below the fold.

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Posted in logic, science | 18 Comments

Michael Williams on Popper

Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology, Oxford Uni Press, 2001. At Amazon.

Ernest Sosa, of Brown University, writes

A masterly introduction to epistemology and an original contribution, this book succeeds on both levels. Those who know Michael Williams’s earlier work will not be surprised by the rich texture of his writing and by how well it conveys the history and geography of the land of epistemology, while staking out a position of his own within it. Without piling on references, never woodenly didactic, Williams’s manuscript still shows his mastery of the subject, in both its historical length and its contemporary breadth.

This is one of a genre of books where the central issue is the justification of beliefs with scarcely a  hint of the CR or Popperian approach. Williams is better than most because he actually mentions Popper several times, sometimes in passing and once with a few lines of dismissive criticism. The book received a number of five star reviews on the Amazon site and the one that is billed as the most helpful can be read to get a fair impression of the content. Continue reading

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Critical Rationalism vs. Inductive and Subjective Interpretations of Probability

So I am trying to understand the critical rationalist arguments against the inductive and subjective interpretations of probability. I am not all that familiar with the matter, and so I have likely made some elementary mistakes — feedback is appreciated. Although the views expressed here are based on the arguments of Popper and Miller, I have only been exposed to their relevant work secondhand. I thank Kenneth Hopf for originally explaining the basic argument to me, though he shouldn’t be blamed for what are probably my errors. Continue reading

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A Pancritical Paradox?

In Retreat to Commitment, Bartley characterises a pancritical rationalist as one who,

holds all his positions, including his most fundamental standards, goals, and decisions, and his basic philosophical position itself, open to criticism; one who protects nothing from criticism by justifying it irrationally; one who never cuts off an argument by resorting to faith or irrational commitment to justify some belief that has been under severe critical fire; one who is committed, attached, addicted, to no position.

Working from this characterisation, some have alleged that pancritical rationalism has analogous logical flaws to justificationism. In particular, holding every position open to criticism is said to entail similar paradoxes as demanding that every position should be justified. Consider the following example:

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Posted in epistemology, logic | 4 Comments

New book by Joanna Swann

Hot off the press, a new book on Learning, Teaching and Education Research.

A brief profile.

A previous book.

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The philosophy of science at the Uni of NSW

The University of New South Wales is the second biggest university in the state after the University of Sydney. This is the page in the handbook describing the Philosophies of Science unit in the Philosophy School.

There are three modules which are taught in rotation. The module on positivism is interesting from the CR point of view!

Module: “Positivism and After”
The nature and reliability of knowledge is a perennial question at the heart of the philosophy of science. Is there a scientific method? How does science differ from other enterprises and other kinds of knowledge? This course places such questions in the context of answers of the ‘Logical Postivists (Empiricists)’ in the early 20th Century – the Vienna Circle, following Ludwig Wittgenstein. The module will introduce key ideas of the Positivists concerning the nature of science and its methods, including particularly the question of how we might distinguish genuine science from various forms of pseudo-science or ‘metaphysics’. These philosophical attempts to understand the nature of science led to a major re-evaluation following the work of Thomas Kuhn on the Structure of Scientific Revolutions and the course will examine the directions that philosophy of science took in this post-positivist period, including the sociological approaches of ‘science studies’.

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Deirdre McCloskey on Popper and rhetoric

Deirdre McCloskey is a passionate advocate of rhetoric in economics as opposed to “big M” Methodology. She is a well-qualified and hugely published economist with a current project to produce several fat volumes of history and rhetoric to demonstrate the role of the bourgeoise virtues in generating the comfort and freedoms that we enjoy these days.

She likes to project the image of a “tough New York broad” and the result is a style that obscures her message. The bluster and smart-alec citations actually undermine the core of her case which is (I think) that we need to lift our game in critical arguments (which she calls rhetoric) instead of being over-awed by scientism, defective statistical analysis and especially by the ruling fashions in the positivist philosophy and methodology of science.

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A nice site

This is a very attractive and informative site, has it been around for long, I may have seen it and forgotten about it.

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A Popper Prize in Western Australia

Out of the blue, or at least from the western edge of the known world, a Popper Prize at the University of WA.  Who is John Saunders?

Thanks to David Miller for the feed.

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