The Meta-Problem of Induction

Suppose that every problem of induction in the past has been solvable. What, then, justifies our expectation that future problems of induction are solvable? Answering induction merely presupposes that induction doesn’t have any unsolvable problems, because if it does have unsolvable problems, then it can’t justify our expectation that it doesn’t. However, if we can’t justify our expectation that future problems of induction are solvable, then what justifies the use of induction today?

About Lee Kelly

Amateur philosopher
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One Response to The Meta-Problem of Induction

  1. Frank Lovell says:

    ExACTly! Ergo, Critical Rationalism (eternal critical argument to preference), Q.E.D. Nice work!

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