Someone on the History and Philosophy of Science email list asked for (1) a general introduction to the philosophy of science in the 20th century and (2) something on Pierre Duhem’s thoughts on “good sense” in science. By a stroke of good fortune there are some paras on that topic in my thesis on the Duhem problem. He launched a devastating attack on what we now call “normal science” and also at the abuse of mathematics in science (a problem that he traced to the influence of Kant). Be warned that the quotes are not properly marked in the on-line version of the thesis, the formatting went awry and I have not bothered to fix it because it is clear enough.
A sample from the thesis.
“In proportion as an experimental science is perfected, the hypotheses upon which it rests, at first hesitantly and confusedly, become more precise and firm…From this moment on, these propositions serve as principles in processes of reasoning at the conclusion of which is found the clarification of certain observations or the prediction of certain events…science uses the deductive method more and more.” (Duhem, 1991, 27)
According to the mathematical/deductive cast of mind which comes into its own in the situation described above – the period of consolidation of theoretical progress – “an experimental science is born the day that it takes deductive form, or better still, the day it becomes clothed in mathematical apparel” (ibid, 29).
Duhem invokes Kant as a majestic expositor of the notion that theories of nature are not properly scientific except for the amount of mathematics which they contain. On this criterion chemistry was ruled out of court as ‘purely empirical’.
“To the extent that a concept capable of being constructed shall not have been found for the chemical action of matter, chemistry cannot be anything but a systematic art or an experimental doctrine, but in no case a science properly speaking, for the principles of chemistry [in that case] are purely empirical and do not allow of being represented a priori in intuition. They do not in the least make the possibility of fundamental laws of chemical phenomena conceivable for they are not capable of being worked on by mathematics.” (Kant, quoted in Duhem, 1991, 30)
Duhem noted how various disciplines arose in some countries (such as France) and later became institutionalised at the mathematico-deductive stage in Germany where ‘research factories’ churned out results without need of intuition or originality. At the same time the fruits of these labours can pay off handsomely through practical applications in industry and technology. Despite the potential for scientific progress and technological developments under these conditions Duhem located two dangerous features that were likely to emerge. One is a tendency to impose mathematics and the deductive form on developing sciences before intuition and experiment have had time to deliver the foundations of well-tested theories required to support extended mathematical and deductive development. The other is the neglect of the need for rigorous testing to ensure that first principles remain open to development by error-elimination. Duhem’s comments on this point read a little like an anticipation of some critiques of “normal science”.
“There, each student punctually, scrupulously, carried out the small bit of work which the chief has entrusted to him. He does not discuss the task which he has received. He does not criticize the thought that dictated this task. He does not get tired of always doing the same measurement with the same instrument” (Duhem, 1991, 122).
According to Duhem, Pasteur provides a model of the kind of mind which avoids those defects, blending rigorous thinking with the spirit of intuition. Duhem’s account of Pasteur is based on stories from assistants in the great man’s laboratory.
Where can critical rationalism be traced?