Critical Rationalism in a Nutshell

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This thought has been hovering around in my mind for a while. It seems to me the core of the critical rationalist mindset. We create our problems by choosing our ends, and we can dissolve them just by changing our minds. This thought captures the notion that problems should be interesting and possible to solve, and anything that is neither interesting nor possible to solve is not a problem at all.

If an objection can be brought against everything, then it ought not to be brought against anything

More precisely, where S is a set of potential solutions, if x is F is true for every member of S, then the matter of whether x is F should not be problematic, because F cannot discriminate among members of S.

For example, the problem of identifying the largest prime number is dissolved when it is discovered that for every prime number there is a greater prime number. Likewise, the problem of justifying our beliefs is dissolved when it is discovered that no beliefs are justifiable. The existence of a problem depends upon it being possible for the facts to change the relative position of potential solutions.

What do you think?

About Lee Kelly

Amateur philosopher
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6 Responses to Critical Rationalism in a Nutshell

  1. Kenneth Hopf says:

    Coincidentally, the project I’m working on now involves something like a summary of critical rationalism in a series of propositions. I’ve thought a lot about how to approach the topic of “critical rationalism in a nutshell” and I think I’d have to say that it cannot be brought down to a single aphorism. Perhaps a dozen, but not one. There is a characteristic attitude about rationality, what argument can and cannot achieve, what the truth must be like, and where we ought to put our priorities. There is also a rather uncompromising view about the connection between intellectual and moral integrity. When you think about it, critical rationalism is really out of place in the modern world. Popper was always complaining about feeling himself to be old-fashioned, unsympathetic to modern tendencies. Even his taste in music reflected this, which I think is why he reminds me sometimes of Anton Bruckner. Anyway, I’m struggling to put it all into a readable document, but it isn’t easy.

  2. Lee Kelly says:

    Hi Ken,

    I agree there is more to critical rationalism than what I wrote. At least, however, my little maxim succinctly states the critical rationalist rejoinder to irrationalism, reletavism, postmodernism, etc.

    It’s nice to see you comment. I always enjoyed your posts at the old Yahoo forums. But you have scarcely made yourself evident here.

  3. Elliot says:

    This is an example of what could be a CR motto: “Criticism is powerful”.

    Some criticisms, like “Having F can’t be bad b/c all the options have F” apply widely.

    I think it’s clearer to use English language criticisms instead of trying to be formal and invent a special case.

  4. Frank Lovell says:

    Lee, you asked what we think. I think your maxim is valid and succinct.

    One way I put this to other people is that a particular criticism of a particular position (or theory) which is just as applicable to and valid against all other competing positions (or theories) is of no value because it neither specially injures that particular position (or theory) nor specially aids any of its competitors.

    But I like your formulation much better!

  5. Lee Kelly says:

    Thanks Frank!

    Notice how, in the context of this principle, talk of “foundations” seems wildly inappropriate, because it is all about the relative standing of competing positions.

  6. Rafe says:

    Relative standing indeed!
    As per a point made in debate with Gene Callahan: it is helpful to draw a distinction between the kind of justification that is sought by foundationalists and the justification of a PREFERENCE between options, whether a theory, a policy, a house…That brings the discussion down from the clouds to examine the options and the evidence and arguments that contribute to the preference. Foundations are not supposed to move but preferences can change in response to new evidence, new arguments, and new options.

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