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Monthly Archives: February 2010
Sir John Eccles on falsification
Until 1944 I had succeeded moderately well in the conventional scientific manner with beliefs that may be categorized as follows: that hypotheses grow out of the careful and methodical collection of experimental data; that the excellence of a scientist is … Continue reading
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Peter Munz on knowledge as representation
Since knowledge is always knowledge of regularities and has therefore to be couched in terms of universal laws, it follows that knowledge cannot be representational. Knowledge is neither a map nor a mirror nor a portrait. Once this is admitted, … Continue reading
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Peter Munz on Wittgenstein’s meaning as use
The philosophy of late Wittgenstein consisted largely in the contention that the meaning of a sentence consists in its ‘use’. If ‘use’ equals ‘meaning’ then ‘meaning’ equals ‘use’. [footnote omitted] Since all knowledge is a linguistic phenomenon or something expressed … Continue reading
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Isaiah Berlin on monism
"The enemy of pluralism is monism — the ancient belief that there is a single harmony of truths into which everything, if it is genuine, in the end must fit. The consequence of this belief (which is something different from, … Continue reading
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Karl Popper on the scientific status of Darwin’s theory of evolution
When speaking here of Darwinism, I shall speak always of today’s theory–that is Darwin’s own theory of natural selection supported by the Mendelian theory of heredity, by the theory of the mutation and recombination of genes in a gene pool, … Continue reading
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Karl Popper on the importance of grasping the problem situation
My second thesis is that what appears to be the prima facie method of teach- ing philosophy is liable to produce a philosophy which answers Wittgenstein’s description. What I mean by ‘prima facie method of teaching philosophy’, and what would … Continue reading
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Karl Popper on logic of falsification
The falsifying mode of inference here referred to — the way in which the falsification of a conclusion entails the falsification of the system from which it is derived — is the modus tollens of classical logic. It may be … Continue reading
Karl Popper on scientific ethics
The hope of getting some argument or theory to share our responsibilities is, I believe, one of the basic motives of ‘scientific’ ethics. ‘Scientific’ ethics is in its absolute barrenness one of the most amazing of social phenomena. What does … Continue reading
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Karl Popper on moral decision making
As we have seen before (in chapter 5), and now again in our analysis of the uncritical version of rationalism, arguments cannot determine such a fundamental moral decision. But this does not imply that our choice cannot be helped by … Continue reading
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Karl Popper on the self as a unique individual
Although I am mainly concerned with the moral aspect of the conflict between rationalism and irrationalism, I feel that I should briefly touch upon a more ‘philosophical’ aspect of the problem; but I wish to make it clear that I … Continue reading
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