Some notes on rationality

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CRist (critical rationalist) – A person who does NOT hold a theory of rationality.

TRist (traditional rationalist) – A person who does hold a theory of rationality.

A CRist needs to distinguish between the truth and falsity in every case, at least when such a case comes up for questioning.

A TRist need only apply his theory of rationality to whatever assertion is in question. As such, he need never distinguish between truth and falsity. His theory does that for him.

In this way, CRists have a need to distinguish between truth and falsity, TRists do not.

I saw a question posed in the the CR (critical rationalism) forum recently which asked, how could a person have no need to distinguish between the truth and falsity of an assertion, such that they didn’t have a theory of rationality?

This seemed to suggest that TRists recognize that there is a need to distinguish between truth and falsity, while CRists don’t.

Yet it would seem to be just the opposite. As TRists have a theory of rationality to distinguish truth from falsity for them, they need not do it themselves. As CRists have no such theory of rationality, they must distinguish between truth and falsity themselves.

In other words, if such a theory of rationality existed and really worked, the truth would take care of itself. We would never have to decide anything. What CR is asserting is that we always *must* decide, such that there can’t really be a method, or meta-method, at least not in any *positive* sense.

An example might be induction. Theories of rationality using induction are a bit like this: First, we look at particular cases. When we note a pattern that is repeating itself, after a certain number of repetitions of a *particular* our theory of rationality tells us to classify it as a universal. After many observations of “a swan is white” I classify “all swans are white.” as true. (There are various arguments for asserting such a method, or meta-method. In my opinion all face some serious flaws.)

Certain Christians perhaps assert that their method for deciding truth is to listen to God, divine inspiration, or to trust the word of God as presented in the bible. Some scientists say we should use induction, some Christians divine inspiration or the Bible, Buddhists perhaps emphasize meditation … hopefully you get the picture. Rather than rely on human judgment, actual judgment is placed upon some theory of rationality. (I’ll note here that I don’t think CR is *necessarily* incompatible with religion. But I’ll save that for a separate discussion.)

CR suggest, as I understand it, that there simply is no *positive* method whereby we can obtain the truth. Not only this, CR suggests that attemping to hold to such a *positive* method might narrow our viewpoint such that the quest for truth is made more difficult. In an attempt to get our decision about the truth to fit with some narrow view of what the method of truth *should* be, we will be restricting ourselves in a way that is unnecessary. After all, there is no one method that is the end-all-be-all of obtaining truth.

Ultimately determining truth is something inexplicable that humans do. There’s no way to figure out how they do this, such that it can be condensed into a sure fire algorithm. There’s no way to create an algorithm that would determine truth. See:

http://www.geocities.com/criticalrationalist/popperindividual.htm

However, CR does accept that people can make progress towards the truth. This is taken as a working assumption. (It’s open to criticism.)

While CR does not support any *positive* method, a *negative* method is sort of suggested. We can approach the truth primarily by trying to understand new ideas, letting these new ideas come into conflict with previously held ideas, and thereby making adjustments which bring us closer to the truth. Note, I take the term new ideas fairly broadly such that it could conceivably even be taken as a new observation. For example, I find a black swan. I now hold that there is at least one black swan. That’s a new idea for me. New ideas if rejected, of course, don’t really come into conflict with older ideas. There’s no rule that says we *must* take on board any new idea. What we must do is look for new ideas, or think them up, and then take them under consideration.

As we take on new ideas, we bring them into conflict with the old ones. The sorting process leaves us closer to the truth. The more we can do to facilitate this process the better we can do at getting nearer to the truth.

One way to facilitate this process is to argue against *positive* methods for obtaining the truth, which overly restrict our viewpoints.

An important thing to note is that TR (traditional rationalism) leads to irrationalism. Imagine you have a theory of rationality.

How did you decide about this theory? As this is your meta-theory, it can not judge itself in terms of rationality. Any *positive* argument in regards to rationality cannot judge itself without creating a circular argument.

For example:

A: Why are you rational?

B: Because I listen to God.

A: How do you know that listening to God is rational.

B: Because God told me.

That’s circular.

As such, you *must* say the choice was merely irrational and that all such first choices are irrational. But, this is like saying we chose such theories without any reference to their consequences then hold to them come what may. As if to say, we can be rational but only after first making an irrational commitment. I don’t think that is the case. In fact, rather than an appeal to rationality, it is an appeal to irrationality. That is, by asserting there is a theory of rationality, this leads you to the next move, which why is the theory of rationality, in and of itself, rational? Here you can only assert it was an irrational choice and all such first choices are by necessity irrational. As such you open the door to whole scale irrationality. If you allow one choice, then why not many. CR avoids having to make this capitulation to irrationality by NOT offering any *positive* theory of rationality.

Another question, why should all other theories be subservient to one particular theory of rationality? When crossing the street do you actually apply a theory of rationality? “Hm, I see some cars coming. Is that a rational thought? Let’s see, what does my theory of rationality say about this?” Nobody does this. The only reason people use theories of rationality is when they want to assert moral superiority. That’s the only purpose they serve. Some people want to say their opinion is better than someone else’s opinion. In order to show it is better, they resort to a theory of rationality.

The only possible benefit you can possibly receive from having a *positive* theory of rationality is it can give you a sense of moral superiority when dealing with others. That is, if you think your theory of rationality is correct, you could be *sure* you were right and whoever disagrees with you is wrong. Or at least you could argue that way. However, your opponent could merely point out your theory of rationality itself was also irrational. At this point the argument ends. You both take your irrational stand and the only way to resolve the conflict is to engage in violence.

CR, however, merely asserts that we recognize that when we try to bring our current views into conflict with new views, we get nearer to the truth. If there is a conflict of opinions, this is good. One of us might be closer to the truth and by working to understand the other, there is the possibility of a breakthrough. (However, if the other has a theory of rationality this will be a big hindrance. Rather than try to work to explain their view and find relevant criticism of your view, they will merely assert they are right. They are right because their theory of rationality says so. Theories of rationality have a tendency to turn off the discussion.)

People with theories of rationality take stands, CRists keep arguing. They keep trying to shift through the ideas to try and figure-out where the disagreement lays and what might resolve it. This is an endless process. It might not be resolved until some new ideas come along. But even then, this will probably only lead to new disagreements. All the better.

CR could almost be viewed as the complete absence of holding of any traditional theory of rationality.

People who hold close to some theory of rationality at this point usually ask weird questions, like, “what if a man believes the moon is made of green cheese?” or “why should I accept that cold blooded murder is wrong?”

They feel as if without some theory of rationality they will be lost without rudder at sea. However, it is perfectly acceptable NOT to believe the moon is made of green cheese, even if you don’t have a theory of rationality. It is perfectly acceptable to hold that cold blooded murder is wrong even without a theory of rationality. It’s as if people who want a theory of rationality think they need permission to think this way or that. They don’t.

In this sense, I tend to think CR shows far more trust in humanity than traditional theories of rationality do.


[These notes were written on November 8, 2004. I hope I have a chance to revise them in the future. People really interested in this issue should read W. W. Bartley’s: Limits of Criticism (doc). ]

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3 Responses to Some notes on rationality

  1. Dee says:

    It is perfectly acceptable to hold that cold blooded murder is wrong even without a theory of rationality.
    And is it acceptable – without a theory of rationality – to hold that cold blooded murder is right?

  2. Matt says:

    Dee,

    This post is dated February 2, 2010 — but that is mostly relevant to when the blog was started here. This essay was actually written at least six or seven years ago, and there’s a lot of it I actually don’t like anymore.

    However, as far as the point of there being no justification and criticism being the key, I still very much agree with this. I do think moral issues are especially difficult, but I don’t think they are impossible to deal with.

    You remark strikes me as smarky because your trying to put words in my mouth.

    But it is an important issue, because I think the 20th century was rife with political philosophies and ideologies that really did feel they could justify cold blooded murder. This ranges from the Nazi’s attempt to exterminate a large portion Jewish people to Stalin’s various political purges to the cultural revolution in China to the use of the atomic bomb in Japan to the fire bombing of Dresden … and on and on and on … even now, terrorists kill civilians wantonly, and the US periodically bombs targets with drones — the victims often civilians.

    I think if we look back at Dostoevsky’s famous novel, _Crime and Punishment_ what’s so riveting about the novel is that the hero feels that he is rationally justified in committing murder and so he feels he simply must follow through — yet at the same time he’s deeply disturbed by the actions he feels he must take.

    I think all of this is strongly related to the idea of justification — and how it leads us astray.

    Popper’s philosophy on the other hand puts its *faith* — if we can use that word — in argument. The critical rationalism position doesn’t justify itself, instead it relentlessly criticizes those philosophies that think they’ve obtained justification. Indeed one criticism is to show us to what violent ends such justifications may lead us.

    Now there are going to be those who resist argument. All we can do is talk with these people, we can put our position up along side theirs, and via mutual criticism see which one is left standing.

    However, If a person is actually violent — that is not only not willing to listen to argument, but actually violent — then we have to stop them. If we don’t stop them, there would be serious consequences for this, right?

    This position isn’t *justified* but we can certainly see the consequences of the converse and criticize it.

    Popper discusses this quite a bit in _The Open Society and Its Enemies_. He argues we can’t tolerate the intolerant. This is a reasonable position, I think. I don’t have any criticisms of it.

    But if you are arguing form the viewpoint we need justification, then you are *required* to justify any prohibition against murder. Are you saying you have such a justification? If so, then please present it.

    Beyond all this, I think you are just being frivolous.

  3. hlengiwe zuma says:

    hi matt
    im a first a year student at unisa and i have an assiggnment about CR its want four ideas about CR in the clasrooms

    many thanks

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